Is Lai Ching-te’s presidential victory in Taiwan, which had seemed to affirm the Taiwanese people’s resistance to pressure to surrender the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China, being negated by a legislative coalition dominated by the KMT?
Has the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party as it exists in Taiwan definitely switched from the “three nots” of its (former?) modern policy toward China to two negatives and an affirmative, the affirmative being a Yes to opening the door to unification with the mainland on the mainland’s terms?
According to Associated Press (May 28, 2024):
Taiwan’s opposition-controlled legislature passed changes on Tuesday that are seen as favoring China and diminishing the power of the island’s president, sparking protests by thousands of people.
The changes pushed by the opposition Nationalist Party and its allies would give the legislature greater power to control budgets, including defense spending that the party has blocked in what many see as a concession to China.
It remains unclear whether the package of bills will become law….
The Nationalists, also known as the KMT, officially back unification with China, from which Taiwan separated during a civil war in 1949. They took control of the legislature with a single-seat majority after elections in January, while the presidency went to Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party, which favors Taiwan’s de facto independence from China and is hated by Beijing.
In its summary of KMT’s history since 1912, Britannica reports that after losing the civil war with the communists, the KMT and other refugees fled the mainland in 1949 and 1950 to Taiwan and various small islands off the coast of mainland China that were now to constitute the Republic of China. The KMT held a virtual monopoly on power in the ROC until late in the last century.
The Nationalists remained in power throughout the 1990s, but in 2000 the DPP’s presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, defeated the Nationalists’ candidate, Lien Chan, who finished third. In legislative elections the following year the Nationalist Party not only lost its majority in the legislature but its plurality in the number of seats (to the DPP). However, in 2004 the Nationalists and their allies regained control of the legislature, and in 2008 the party captured nearly three-fourths of the legislative seats, crushing the DPP.
Britannica adds that to “resolve Taiwan’s long-standing differences with China, the party endorsed the policy of the ‘Three Nots’: not unification, not independence, and not military confrontation.”
The formulation is knotty. In any case, though, in cooperation with the Taiwan People’s Party and in opposition to the Democratic Progressive Party, the KMT has in recent days passed legislation widely seen as repressive in nature and as appeasing the mainland. Tens of thousands of people have swarmed the national legislature in protest. But “Despite Protests, Taiwan’s KMT, TPP Pass Controversial Bills to Expand Legislative Powers” (Brian Hioe, The Diplomat, May 29, 2024).
The bills were pushed for by the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who together have a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. Now the Lai administration must decide how to handle a major political controversy of a scale not seen since the 2014 Sunflower Movement [shown above]—all in the first week of taking office….
Protests of a few hundred grew to 30,000, according to organizers, on May 21, one day after President Lai Ching-te was sworn into office. On May 24, 100,000 took to the streets around the legislature in what was termed the “Bluebird Movement.” Another 70,000 demonstrated on May 28, with other protests planned in 15 cities in Taiwan and overseas solidarity actions occurring in the U.S., U.K., and Europe. Yet the protesters were not able to prevent the contested laws from passing.
The demonstrations were organized by a coalition of 50 civil society groups, some of which date back to the period of Taiwan’s democratization, and many of which were involved in the Sunflower Movement a decade prior.
Although the legislation is not a done deal, things don’t look good for its opponents in the government or out on the street. The Executive Yuan and President Lai can still try to stop it, but they don’t seem to have much power to do so despite the AP’s flat statement that the Executive Yuan “may veto legislation.” The Diplomat says that the Executive Yuan, “Taiwan’s executive branch of government, can use its powers of oversight to raise issues with the bill. The DPP has also stated that it will seek a constitutional interpretation of the bill.” President Lai cannot outright block the legislation but only “return it to the legislature for another 15 days of discussion.”
Article 57 of the ROC constitution states that a two-thirds majority is required to uphold legislation sent back to the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration. But this provision has been superseded by later articles. These state that if the Legislative Yuan fails to reach a resolution within 15 days when asked to reconsider a bill, the bill will not be enacted; but that if within this period “more than one-half of the total number of Legislative Yuan members uphold the original bill, the president of the Executive Yuan shall immediately accept the said bill.”
To achieve final passage, then, it seems that—if the recent legislation is indeed sent back to the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration—the KMT-TPP coalition need only remain as determined to shove it through as it was a few days ago.
Also see:
The Diplomat: “Taiwan’s KMT: Between a Rock and a Hard Place” (August 15, 2022)
“China’s aggressive maneuvers are making it harder for Taiwan’s main opposition party to finesse its cross-strait stance.”
The Diplomat: “As Taiwan’s New President Takes Office, Can China Seize Taiwan Without Firing a Single Shot?” (May 22, 2024)
“A controversial bill in the Legislative Yuan sparks fears of a hostile takeover from within, inspiring mass protests.”
The Diplomat: “In Lawmaking, the Details Matter. Taiwan Would be Wise to Remember That”
“Even more concerning is the scope and ease afforded to the Legislative Yuan for investigations of almost any type, even of non-governmental entities in the civic and private sectors. Embedded within the proposed reforms is a nongovernmental law eerily similar to those used by authoritarians around the world to wage lawfare against civil society. Civil society organizations could face politically motivated investigations and shutdown as a result.”
The Diplomat: “Taiwan’s Democracy in Crisis: Next Steps and Their Importance for the World” (May 29, 2024)
“Doubts about the accountability of Taiwan’s legislators are growing due to just-passed legal provisions that some claim are unconstitutional. These could potentially allow China to access personal data and increase surveillance, raising alarms among civil society groups. Despite this, the Kuomintang (KMT), the party behind the bill, has not addressed these concerns and plans to explain the legislation’s complexities only after its passage. As of late on May 28, the bill has passed its final reading and will be submitted to the president for enactment.”
StopTheChinazis.org: “What Is This ‘Republic of China’?”
“The constitution of Taipei and its amendments refer to the Republic of China. Our shortcut references to ‘Taiwan’ lead us into serious analytic mistakes…. The ROC is independent of the PRC, always has been. No declaration is needed.”
