If a law is used just as intended—to provide an explicit if vague rationalization for violating the rights of the innocent—do such applications constitute an “abuse” of that very law?
The question is raised by the title of a Sankei Shimbun editorial, “China’s Revised Counterespionage Law Invites Abuse” (July 11, 2023).
China’s amended law expands upon the definition of espionage under its counterespionage law that came into force in 2014. In addition to “state secrets,” the revision adds theft of “documents, data, materials, or items related to national security or national interests” to the definition of espionage.
Naturally, the problem is with the opaque definition of “national security or interests.” Only Beijing knows what specific acts it wants to punish as crimes. . . .
In China, there has been a series of arrests of Japanese nationals on allegations of espionage. In March, a Japanese executive of drug manufacturer Astellas Pharma was detained in Beijing. The flagrant mistreatment of Japanese people under the revised counterespionage law cannot continue.
The new law certainly invites abuse of the persons against whom it will be used, the persons who will then be detained, i.e., imprisoned. And there is, unfortunately, every reason to believe that the abuse will continue of foreign nationals who inadvertently do something to provoke the unfavorable attention of the Chinese government.
The Sankei Shimbun editorial also responds to Premier Li Qiang, who during a recent trip overseas had urged Europeans to step up their investment in China. “Could Qiang be so clueless,” the editors wonder, “as not to comprehend that the Chinese authorities are the ones hindering such investment?”
But the Chinese authorities have learned that they can get away with an awful lot of abusive treatment of foreign interests and foreign persons before provoking any really serious opposition.